T
Taoistattack
Mache gerade Recherche und bin auf eine Rede gestoßen in der 6 Methoden erklärt werden die durch die Geschichte hindurch von Großbanken angewand wurden um sich auf Krisen vorzubereiten um mit ihnen Geld verdienen zu können.
Leider sind gerade diese Methoden in der Fachsprache beschrieben worden - sprich ich könnte es nur mit einer aufwändigen Recherche verstehen, daher wollte ich mal hier nachfragen ob sie mir jemand erklären könnte.
Für Jemanden der wissen will wie es wirklich läuft, wäre es auch ein sehr interessanter Text
Wurde vor der Bank of England gehalten und die werden sich sicherlich keinen Idioten einladen - sozusagen von Insidern für Insider he he.
Der Link:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf
Die erste Methode:
3. Time-Consistency and the Banking Safety Net
What explains this time-inconsistency? A simple framework is developed to explain
the existence of, and ratchet in, the safety net. It focuses on the incentive structures
facing owners of banks and the risk strategies they pursue. The run-up to the present
crisis provides several examples of those incentives and strategies at work.
Take the payoff profile facing a bank shareholder. Assume that the sensitivity of the
bank’s assets to aggregate risk – in the language of finance, its beta - equals 0.1. So
for every 10% movement in the market as a whole, the bank’s assets move by 1%.
Assume too that the beta of the bank’s deposits is zero and that the bank has an equity
capital ratio of 10%. While arbitrary, these numbers are broadly plausible.
Conveniently, under those assumptions the beta of the bank’s equity equals one.
The return on a bank’s equity lies on a 45 degree line when market returns are
positive. Gains to shareholders are potentially unlimited. But the same is not true in
bad states of the world. The reason is limited liability. That constrains the losses of
shareholders to around zero. Losses beyond that point are borne by other parts of
banks’ capital structure - wholesale and retail depositors. Therein lies the problem.
If protection of depositors is felt to be a public good, these losses instead risk being
borne by the state, either in the form of equity injections from the government (capital
insurance), payouts to retail depositors (deposit insurance) or liquidity support to
12 Laeven and Valencia (op.cit.).
wholesale funders (liquidity insurance). The gains risk being privatised and the losses
socialised. Evidence suggests this is a repeated historical pattern.
Socialised losses are doubly bad for society. Taxes may not only be higher on
average. They may also need to rise when they are likely to be most painful to
taxpayers, namely in the aftermath of crisis. So taxes profiles will be spiky rather
than smooth and will spike when the chips are down. This is the opposite to what tax
theory would tells us was optimal.
So far, so bad. But it is about to get worse, for this tells only half the story. This is a
repeated game. State support stokes future risk-taking incentives, as owners of banks
adapt their strategies to maximise expected profits. So it was in the run-up to the
present crisis. In particular, five such strategies were clearly in evidence:
Und dann geht's weiter - wenn es mit jemand erklären könnte wäre ich froh
Wünsche euch allen ein frohes neues
Leider sind gerade diese Methoden in der Fachsprache beschrieben worden - sprich ich könnte es nur mit einer aufwändigen Recherche verstehen, daher wollte ich mal hier nachfragen ob sie mir jemand erklären könnte.
Für Jemanden der wissen will wie es wirklich läuft, wäre es auch ein sehr interessanter Text
Wurde vor der Bank of England gehalten und die werden sich sicherlich keinen Idioten einladen - sozusagen von Insidern für Insider he he.Der Link:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech409.pdf
Die erste Methode:
3. Time-Consistency and the Banking Safety Net
What explains this time-inconsistency? A simple framework is developed to explain
the existence of, and ratchet in, the safety net. It focuses on the incentive structures
facing owners of banks and the risk strategies they pursue. The run-up to the present
crisis provides several examples of those incentives and strategies at work.
Take the payoff profile facing a bank shareholder. Assume that the sensitivity of the
bank’s assets to aggregate risk – in the language of finance, its beta - equals 0.1. So
for every 10% movement in the market as a whole, the bank’s assets move by 1%.
Assume too that the beta of the bank’s deposits is zero and that the bank has an equity
capital ratio of 10%. While arbitrary, these numbers are broadly plausible.
Conveniently, under those assumptions the beta of the bank’s equity equals one.
The return on a bank’s equity lies on a 45 degree line when market returns are
positive. Gains to shareholders are potentially unlimited. But the same is not true in
bad states of the world. The reason is limited liability. That constrains the losses of
shareholders to around zero. Losses beyond that point are borne by other parts of
banks’ capital structure - wholesale and retail depositors. Therein lies the problem.
If protection of depositors is felt to be a public good, these losses instead risk being
borne by the state, either in the form of equity injections from the government (capital
insurance), payouts to retail depositors (deposit insurance) or liquidity support to
12 Laeven and Valencia (op.cit.).
wholesale funders (liquidity insurance). The gains risk being privatised and the losses
socialised. Evidence suggests this is a repeated historical pattern.
Socialised losses are doubly bad for society. Taxes may not only be higher on
average. They may also need to rise when they are likely to be most painful to
taxpayers, namely in the aftermath of crisis. So taxes profiles will be spiky rather
than smooth and will spike when the chips are down. This is the opposite to what tax
theory would tells us was optimal.
So far, so bad. But it is about to get worse, for this tells only half the story. This is a
repeated game. State support stokes future risk-taking incentives, as owners of banks
adapt their strategies to maximise expected profits. So it was in the run-up to the
present crisis. In particular, five such strategies were clearly in evidence:
Und dann geht's weiter - wenn es mit jemand erklären könnte wäre ich froh
Wünsche euch allen ein frohes neues
